I. The
Formation of Article 23
II. Treason
III. Sedition
IV. Secession
V. Subversion
VI. Theft
of State Secrets
VII. Foreign
Political Organizations

I.
The Formation of Article 23
After China
and the United Kingdom signed the Joint Declaration in 1984, Beijing
set to work immediately on creating the legal framework for resumption
of sovereignty over Hong Kong. In June 1985, the 59-member Basic
Law Drafting Committee, newly created by the National People's
Congress, began the drafting process. The Drafting Committee,
which consisted of thirty-six mainland members and twenty-three
members from Hong Kong, had working committee status directly
under the NPC. The Committee issued the first draft of the Law
in April 1988, and comments were sought from the Hong Kong community
by the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), a body
created by the Drafting Committee expressly for this purpose.
Markedly different from the final version of Article 23, the draft
version of the Article (Article 22 in the first draft) read:
"The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall prohibit by law
any act designed to undermine national unity or subvert the Central
People's Government."
The call for
comments was open to all, and the response was significant: the
CCBL received over 73,000 submissions. On Article 22, recommendations
included elimination of the word "subversion," given
its absence from the common law and its misuse in many jurisdictions.
Other submissions also called for clearer definitions of the crimes
to be legislated under the Article.
These concerns
were only partially addressed in the second draft of the Basic
Law, which was issued in February 1989. Although the word subversion
had been eliminated from the second draft, the revised Draft Article
23 was still a source of concern. The revised Article read:
"The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, or theft
of state secrets."
Once again,
lack of precise definition was a concern in the commentary solicited
by the CCBL. The Committee's summary included the following points:
This article
gives no definition of the expression 'an act of treason, secession,
sedition or theft of state secrets.' Who will be responsible for
giving a definition to such an act? Will speech, publication and
artistic creation within this realm be prohibited?
II. Treason
Treason first
emerged in English common law, and was legislated by the English
Parliament for the first time in the Treason Act of 1351. Originally
broadly defined as any breach of faith owed to the king and severely
punished, treason has since been limited to levying war against
the state or aiding and abetting enemies of the state, usually
in wartime. Intent is a necessary element of the offence in most
jurisdictions; any accidental or unintentional aiding of the enemy
cannot be considered treason, though it may be actionable under
other laws.
III. Sedition
Sedition is
related to treason in that it is incitement to insurrection against
the government. In its pre-modern form, sedition was a distressingly
broad offence:
Sedition is
a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason, and
it frequently precedes treason by a short interval... The objects
of sedition generally are to induce discontent and insurrection,
and stir up opposition to the Government¡K the very tendency of
sedition is to incite people to insurrection and rebellion. Sedition
has been described as disloyalty in action.
Thus defined,
sedition was an effective tool against speech that was critical
of the government, although it was also initially used against
"unlawful societies" and other assemblies judged to
have "seditious intent." The crime was narrowed considerably
in most jurisdictions by the introduction of an intent requirement,
a requirement that the actor actually intend that her or his words
or actions incite violence against the government. The U.S. has
gone one step further: under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, speech is protected from prosecution "unless
it (is) directed to inciting imminent lawless action and (is)
likely to incite that action. " In other words, there must
not only be intent that a threat to the government follow from
the speaker's words, but also a likelihood that it will indeed
emerge. Canadian case law also sets a high standard: the courts
have emphasized that incitement to violence alone is insufficient
to constitute the offence. The violence or defiance incited by
the speaker must be "for the purpose of disturbing constitutional
authority."
IV. Secession
Secession
is the attempt to break off from the central government and declare
an independent state or allegiance to the government of another
state. Because any actual secessionist activity would likely be
actionable as either treason or terrorism, the value of anti-secession
legislation is questionable in the modern era. Anti-secession
legislation could potentially be used against peaceful and law-abiding
advocates of political change or even political independence.
Secession
is an especially thorny issue in the Chinese context, given the
longstanding feud between Beijing and Taipei over the status of
Taiwan, as well as the questions surrounding the status of Tibet,
Xinjiang, and, to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia. Given these
crucial issues, the SAR government should be extremely careful
in drafting legislation on secession so as not to criminalize
free and open debate on the future of Taiwan, Tibet, or any part
of China.
V. Subversion
Perhaps the
most open to manipulation and abuse is the offence of subversion.
Because subversion does not exist in English common law, it is
difficult to precisely define. In the small handful of common-law
countries where the offence does exist, subversion is usually
associated with the overthrow of the government by force. Australia,
one of the few common-law countries to introduce subversion into
the law, defined the offence primarily as an act whose purpose
is to "overthrow or destroy the constitutional government
of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory." Force or
an unlawful act was a necessary element of the offence, and certain
activities directed against the military or against society and
public order as a whole were also covered by the subversion statute.
As with secession,
much of what is covered by the subversion statute might be better
covered by either by anti-terrorism legislation or by treason.
In their commentary on the Australian law, the drafters emphasized
that subversion can only cover that activity "whose purpose
is, directly or ultimately, to overthrow constitutional government
and in the meantime to weaken or to undermine it," and that
any constitutionally approved methods of advocating change in
the government could not be considered subversion. Even this comparatively
tight language, however, could be potentially abused: whether
a particular activity's "ultimate purpose" is the overthrow
of the government could easily become a subjective inquiry, thus
putting protected speech and assembly at risk.
Concern over
the vagueness of the term "subversion" is reflected
in the Australian government's decision to remove the term from
the law in 1986, replacing it with the phrase "politically
motivated violence." The change in language increased the
emphasis on the necessary element of force, and distanced Australian
law from the misuse of anti-subversion statutes in other jurisdictions.
Perhaps more
typical of the use of subversion in the law is its use in mainland
China. Subversion is found in Article 105 of the Criminal Law,
which criminalizes "organizing, scheming or acting to subvert
the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system"
and "incitement to subvert the political power of the state
and overthrow the socialist system by spreading rumors, slander,
or other means." No definition of the key terms is given,
leaving the government a high degree of flexibility in pursuing
its critics. As with all crimes relating to the endangering of
state security, it is not necessary to show intent to do harm
to the government or to show actual harm. After the revision of
the Criminal Law in 1997, it was predicted that Article 105 might
become the most commonly used provision for the suppression of
peaceful political dissent. As expected, a number of high-profile
activists have been prosecuted for subversion over the past four
years, including many activists jailed in 1998 and 1999 for attempting
to form the China Democracy Party.
Ominously,
some of the commentary on the revision of the PRC Criminal Law
in 1997 focused on updating Chinese law so as to be more "compatible"
with the laws of Hong Kong, despite the Basic Law's clear stipulation
that the legal systems would remain distinct. If harmonization
of the two legal systems is, in the view of mainland Chinese legal
scholars, one of the goals of the resumption of sovereignty, then
the mandate of Article 23 becomes more troubling. Given that Chinese
law on subversion and other state security crimes is well below
international standards, the use of Article 23 to bring Hong Kong
law closer to the mainland's will have serious consequences for
rights protection in Hong Kong.
Since a democratic
state and a communist state may have its own conceptions and interpretations
of expressions such as 'treason,' 'secession,' 'sedition' and
'theft of state secrets,' some people hold that as the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law is not vested in the Hong Kong
SAR, the implementation of Article 23 may¡K undermine freedom of
the press and freedom of speech in the HKSAR.
Despite this
commentary, the Drafting Committee actually presented a more conservative
final draft of Article 23, reinserting subversion and adding the
additional language on political organizations. The final draft,
which was incorporated without change into the Basic Law, read:
"The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets,
to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting
political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations or bodies."
As with other
draft articles, the Drafting Committee's decision to ignore the
substantial input on Article 23 it received from the public in
the second round was due in large part to a stiffening of backs
inside the Central Government in the wake of Tiananmen Square.
Support for the protesters in Beijing was strong in Hong Kong:
the people of Hong Kong not only voiced their support, they also
raised funds and sent supplies to the students in Beijing in the
weeks leading up to June 4. After the crackdown, the criticism
from Hong Kong of Beijing's decision to use force likely further
solidified Beijing's fears that Hong Kong would become a center
for what it considered anti-government subversive activity. As
a result, the scope of Article 23 was broadened, and the concerns
raised about its flaws ignored.
VI. Theft of State Secrets
This area
of law was extended to Hong Kong by the Official Secrets Act 1989
in colonial era. It was domesticated by the enactment of the Official
Secrets Ordinance in the last days before the 1997 handover. This
kind of legislation was open to abuse by Mainland government because
it related to the protection of sensitive official information.
To promote an open government, the SAR Government should amend
the Ordinance to prevent abuses and to bring it into line with
international standards set out by the Johannesburg Principles
on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information.
The Ordinance aims to criminalize spying activities and unauthorised
disclosure of official information. Unfortunately, a presumption
is bode ill for the defendant as it states that the defendant
may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, his conduct
or known character, it appears that his purpose was prejudicial
to the safety or interests of the PRC or Hong Kong. It is unnecessary
to show that he was guilty of any particular illegal act.
Any person
undergoing spying activities with purpose prejudicial to the safety
or interests of the PRC or Hong Kong is punishable by law. However,
the vague definition of "safety or interests" which
is susceptible to abuses. On unauthorized disclosure of official
information, it was queried by some members of bills committee
how the offence was related to in Article 23 of the Basic Law;
the latter had a narrower meaning than the former. The offence
is to prohibit public servants to disclose, without proper authorization,
information related to security and intelligence information;
defence; international relations and commission of offences and
criminal investigations. Moreover, it is an offence for any person,
who received information by an unauthorized disclosure by public
servant, discloses that information and causes harm.
VII. Foreign Political Organizations
There was
no such restriction before the handover. By amending the Societies
Ordinance through undemocratically selected Provisional Legislative
Council, section 5 of the Ordinance prohibit local political body
(i.e. political party or the body's main object is to promote
or prepare a candidate for an election) to have a connection with
a foreign political organization (FPO) or a political organization
of Taiwan (POT). "Connection" is defined as financial
support, an affiliation, policy determination or control in decision
making process. The Societies Officer may refuse or cancel registration
of a local political body being connected with an FPO or a POT
after consultation with the Secretary for Security; or he may
recommend to the Secretary for Security to prohibit the operation
of the body.
Apart from
that, if the Societies Officer reasonably believes that they are
necessary in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others, he may exercise the same powers as above after
consultation with the Secretary for Security. The 1992 Societies
Ordinance has copied "public safety" and "public
order" from the ICCPR and modified "national security"
to "security of Hong Kong" as basis for restrictions.
In the 1997 amendments "security of Hong Kong" is dropped
and "national security" and "the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others" are added to the grounds
of prohibition. While there is no demonstrated need to add grounds
for prohibition, the use of the term "national security"
is particularly objectionable because the concept has frequently
been used in Mainland China to criminalize the peaceful exercise
of the rights of expression and to persecute those with legitimate
demands like democracy and human rights. Its inclusion raises
fears of extension of such Mainland Chinese practices to Hong
Kong especially in the light of Article 23 of the Basic Law.
¡iNote: The
above information is mainly taken from the Hong Kong Human Rights
Monitor's publication, "A Ticking Time Bomb? - Article 23,
Security Law, and Human Rights in Hong Kong "(August 2001)¡j